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The Limited Impacts of Formal 
Education on Democratic Citizenship in 
Africa 
 
 
 
Africa is the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world.  Among 
many political and social consequences, poverty and the lack of infrastructure 
place significant limitations on the cognitive skills of ordinary Africans, and 
thus their ability to act as full democratic citizens.  Along with limited access to 
news media, the extremely low levels of formal education found in many 
African countries strike at the very core of the skills and information that enable 
citizens to assess social, economic and political developments, learn the rules of 
government, form opinions about political performance, and care about the 
survival of democracy.   
 
On the basis of the systematic socio-political surveys that have been conducted 
in Africa thus far, only a minority of Africans can be called committed 
democrats (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Yet poorly performing 
leaders, governments and political regimes are often accorded surprisingly high 
levels of positive evaluations and high levels of trust by their citizens. These two 
factors often co-occur in a particularly corrosive form of “uncritical citizenship” 
whereby citizens exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with the quality of 
governance and the performance of democracy than actually demand to live in a 
democracy (Chaligha, Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002; Mattes & Shenga, 
2007).  Uncritical citizenship stands in direct contrast to Pippa Norris’s (1999) 
concept of the “critical citizen” who supports the ideals of democracy yet is 
likely to identify shortcomings in their representative institutions, elected 
leaders, and the policies they pursue.   
 
While these maladies of democratic citizenship have usually been attributed to 
deeply-rooted cultural values endemic to African societies (Etounga-Manguelle, 
2000; Chazan, 1993), previous research has found at least some evidence that 
Africans are more likely to act as agents, rather than subjects, once they gain 
access to higher levels of formal education, make use of print and electronic 
news media, and gain basic knowledge about their political leaders (Bratton, 
Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Evans & Rose, 2007a, 
2007b).   
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As part of a larger research project on the various linkages between higher 
education and democracy in Africa, we extend these studies in this paper in 
three important ways. First, we attempt to unpack the various elements of 
cognitive awareness and isolate and trace the direct and indirect effects of 
formal education.  Second, we examine the effects of formal education across a 
much broader range of dimensions of democratic citizenship than others have 
studied.  Finally, we attempt to isolate and assess the specific impact of higher 
education within this process.  
 
 
Formal Education and Democratic Citizenship 
 
At least since the 19th century, formal education has held a privileged position in 
democratic theory.  An informed, critical and participatory public, skeptical of 
government but tolerant and trusting of other citizens, has been widely seen as 
essential to give life to democracy and safeguard it against other forms of 
political regimes (Lipset, 1959; Almond & Verba, 1963; Diamond, 1997).  
Indeed, while its precise impact may vary across countries, and often depend on 
broader institutional arrangements, public opinion research within Western 
democracies is virtually unanimous in its conclusion that formal education is 
strongly linked to political knowledge, interest and involvement (Dalton, 1996).  
In the words of Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996: 2): 
 
‘The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary 
mechanism behind citizenship characteristics is basically 
uncontested…. Formal education is almost without exception the 
strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and how 
they think about politics.’ 
 
Education’s impact is usually seen to affect citizenship along at least three paths.  
First of all, formal education may affect attitudes and behavior via  a “positional 
path” by sorting citizens into differing social networks, situations and classes 
(Nie et al, 1996).  Second, formal education may promote democratic citizenship 
through a “socialization path” whereby children are explicitly trained to see 
democracy as preferable to its alternatives, accept the authority of the 
democratic state and its officials, and take part in the duties of democratic 
citizenship.  Finally, formal education may facilitate democratic citizenship via a 
“cognitive path,” increasing both people’s verbal and cognitive proficiency, as 
well as their ability to construct their own ideas and critical thoughts. This 
cognitive path provides key facts about history and context, plus a greater ability 
to learn the rules of the political game and the identity of political leaders.  
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“Critical citizens,” in turn, should exhibit a greater ability to tolerate different 
outlooks, reach reasoned electoral choices, and refrain from extremist doctrines 
(Lipset, 1959: 79; Nie et al, 1996; Norris 1999).   
 
But while there is considerable evidence of a positive contribution of formal 
education to various elements of democratic citizenship in Western societies, 
formal education has yet to play such a central role in empirical research outside 
of the industrialized West (though there is growing evidence from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union) (see Evans & Rose, 2007a for a useful 
review).  As Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose (2007: 2) demonstrate, the actual 
evidence of the impact of education in developing societies is “surprisingly 
thin.”  They argue that one of the key reasons is that, while modernization 
theory generally sees education and the development of cognitive skills as a 
“social requisite of democracy” (Lipset, 1959), it tends to bundle education 
together with a range of other forces of progress such as secularization, 
urbanization, industrialization, affluence, and the expansion of the middle class 
(Lipset, 1959; Almond & Verba, 1963; Inkeles & Smith, 1974).  Indeed, latter-
day modernization theory tends to conclude that education is merely a marker of 
more important shapers of pro-democratic values, specifically material security 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
 
Yet, as Evans and Rose (2007a: 4) argue, we infer the “democratic returns to 
education” found in Western settings to developing contexts such as Africa at 
great risk.  Most studies have been conducted in countries where democracy is 
largely taken for granted, schools make at least some explicit attempt to instill 
pro-democratic values, and primary and secondary education is almost universal 
(meaning that the measured impact of education is usually one of intermediate 
and higher education).  In Africa, however, significant numbers of citizens have 
never been inside a formal school, and many have never proceeded beyond 
primary schooling.  And for those who have received some schooling, most have 
been educated in schools run by non-, or less-than-democratic states with no 
pro-democratic tint to their teaching.  Beyond the content of what is taught, the 
dominant style of teaching and learning in Africa’s schools is often said to parrot 
its colonial predecessors, concentrating on rote memorization and failing to 
encourage practical skills, critical thinking or autonomous participation (Harber, 
1997).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that not all scholars would necessarily see this as 
detrimental to democratic citizenship.  A growing number of American political 
scientists now argue that the role of knowledge and cognitive skills is 
overstated.  They claim that the poorly informed tend to reach the same political 
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opinions and decisions as the well informed, largely because they utilize “low 
information reasoning” using personal experience of commonly accessible 
information (like prices, joblessness, housing construction etc.) as heuristic cues 
to evaluate government performance (Popkin, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 
2000). 
 
Besides the assumptions of modernization theory, another principal reason that 
we know little about the impact of formal education outside of the West has 
been the lack of good micro-level data.  This is beginning to change, however, 
with the development of various cross-national, longitudinal Barometer survey 
projects in the developing world. In the first book length analysis of 
Afrobarometer data, Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005) demonstrated that 
formal education, along with an associated range of cognitive factors they call 
“cognitive awareness of politics,” is an important source of popular demand for 
democracy.  Those people who have been to school, who use the news media, 
who know the identity of their political leaders, and who understand democracy 
as a set of political procedures rather than economic outcomes are far more 
likely to prefer democracy and reject its authoritarian alternatives.  In a further 
analysis of data from a subsequent survey conducted in a wider range of 
countries, Evans and Rose (2007b) showed that the impact of formal education 
on the demand for democracy is independent of other elements of 
modernization, such as occupational class position, economic resources, 
urbanization or secularization.   
 
 
Higher Education and Citizenship 
 
Studies of the specific impact of higher education on democratic citizenship are 
rare. The standard operationalization of most variables measuring formal 
education is “years of education” which assumes that all positive contributions 
to democratic citizenship accumulate monotonically the longer one stays in 
school, and then in college or university.  In one exception, Dalton (1996) has 
shown that university education (combined with high levels of political interest) 
makes an important difference in the way Western voters relate to political 
parties and election campaigns.   
 
The overall, system-level impact of college and university education in Africa is 
likely to be minimal simply because so few citizens ever progress to these 
levels. However, there are good reasons to suspect that the micro-level 
democratic dividend of higher education might be more substantial.  If Africa’s 
schools are the sites of rote learning, its colleges and universities offer at least 
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the possibility of a different pedagogy that may be more effective in promoting 
critical skills and habits, and enabling students to appreciate diversity, 
difference, ambiguity, contradiction and nuance (see Cross et al, 1999 and 
World Bank, 2000). Indeed, university students were a driving force behind the 
popular protests that brought down autocratic leaders in many countries across 
Africa in the early 1990s (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). And younger, 
university-trained elected representatives have also formed the core of cross-
party coalitions that have initiated key reforms in some African parliaments 
(Barkan et al, 2004). 
 
Evans and Rose (2007b) attempted to assess the differing impacts of various 
levels of education by creating a series of “dummy” variables (variables that 
take either the value of 0 or 1) for different levels of schooling (primary, 
secondary, post-secondary).  They found that each level of education (including 
post-secondary) made a statistically significant contribution to popular support 
for democracy. While this is encouraging, the finding is less than conclusive 
since standard dummy variable analysis is designed to compare to a referent 
group (in this case, those with no schooling), a series of wholly discrete nominal 
categories with no overlapping or cumulative content. But education is different.  
While each category certainly contains a discrete set of respondents, the concept 
is not discrete. The effect of being in secondary school (compared to having no 
schooling) also includes the effect of having been in primary school; and the 
effect of post-secondary education (when compared to those with no schooling) 
includes the impacts of both primary and secondary schooling.  And while the 
coefficient associated with secondary association might appear to be statistically 
different from those associated with other categories of education, the 
coefficients measure the contrast with a “no education” referent group, not with 
other categories.  Indeed, as Evans and Rose’s (2007b) models become more 
fully specified, the statistical differences between the coefficients associated 
with secondary and post-secondary education diminish rapidly.   
 
Thus, this paper attempts to take three steps beyond what we already know 
about the impact of formal education in Africa.  First, we attempt to unpack the 
set of factors that Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005) call “cognitive 
awareness” and isolate the discrete contribution of formal education to each of 
these other factors. Second, we examine the impact of education on a much 
wider range of facets of democratic citizenship than previous studies of 
Afrobarometer data.  We compare the impact of formal education on (1) rates of 
political participation, (2) the ability to formulate political opinions, (3) basic 
democratic values, and (4) the willingness to offer critical performance 
evaluations.  Third, we examine the distinctive impact of higher education by re-
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analyzing all these linkages only among those who have finished high school (or 
technical training), distinguishing those who have had at least some university 
education. 
 
 
Formal Education in Africa 
 
As of 2005-06, 17 percent of the 21,600 adults interviewed by the 
Afrobarometer across 18 countries told interviewers that they had no formal 
education (though 4 percent say they have had some informal schooling, 
consisting mostly of Islamic Koranic schools (see Figure 1).  21 percent had 
some primary education, and a further 16 percent went as far as completing 
primary school.  Just over one in ten adults (13 percent) said they had completed 
a high school education.  And less than one in ten (9 percent) went beyond high 
school, with just 2 completing university education.  
 
Figure 1: Formal education across 18 African countries, 2005-2006 
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Access to formal education varies widely across countries.1 While large 
proportions of citizens in West Africa have no formal schooling (over one half 
of the sample in Benin, over forty percent in Mali, and one quarter in Ghana and 
Senegal), the relevant proportions are relatively low in Southern Africa (less 
than one tenth in Zambia, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe). 
 
Figure 2: Access to formal education, by country (2005-2006) 
 
 
 
 
Formal education also varies in other important ways. The correlation 
coefficients listed in Table 1 show that older Africans are far less likely to be 
educated than their younger counterparts, as are rural dwellers compared to 
urbanites, and women compared to men.  In turn, we also find that educated 
Africans are far less likely to experience what we call lived poverty (measured 
as the frequency with which respondents go without a range of basic 
necessities).  
 
 
                                                 
1 “Country” accounts for 18 percent of the variation around the mean of education (Eta2 = 
.177 and Eta = .421, p=<.001). 
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Table 1: Demographic Correlates of Formal Education 
 Formal Education 
Age -.281*** 
Rural -.279*** 
Lived Poverty -.255*** 
Female -.107*** 
N=21,583 
 
 
Formal Education and Cognitive Awareness of 
Politics 
 
But do low levels of education preclude Africans from developing a deeper 
cognitive awareness of politics?  Or can un- or less-educated citizens make up 
an educational deficit by listening to electronic news media, or regularly talking 
about politics with spouses, families, neighbors or co-workers, thereby adding 
the experiences of others to their own (Richardson & Beck, 2004)?  Stated 
differently, to what extent do low levels of education limit (or higher levels 
promote) news media use2 (measured as the weekly rate of reading newspapers, 
or listening to radio or watching television news), and the accumulation of 
political information (measured as the extent to which respondents are able to 
provide correct answers to three questions about the identity of political leaders, 
and three questions about the constitutional and governmental system)?3  We 
also wonder whether, and how much formal education facilitates cognitive 
engagement (measured as the frequency of political discussion with friends and 
neighbors, combined with their degree of interest in politics),4 and a sense of 
political efficacy (indicated by the belief that one is able to understand 
government affairs, and that other people listen to what you have to say about 
                                                 
2 Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue1.78) that explains 59.8 
percent of total variance of the three items.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .65) is 
acceptable (n=21,600). 
3 Factor analysis identified two factors, the first of which explains 36.2 percent of total 
variance with an Eigenvalue of 2.17.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .64) is acceptable 
(n=22,600).  Also a comparison of questions on awareness of incumbents with previous 
surveys suggests a high degree of test-retest reliability.  To be sure, measuring citizens’ 
information is always a tricky affair; findings often differ sharply depending on whether 
researchers ask respondents to recall certain facts from memory, or recognize them from a list 
of several possible answers.  Thus, because the Afrobarometer uses the recall method, one 
should be aware that our findings might understate the actual level of awareness. 
4 The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson’s r = .33) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .50) warranting the creation of a two item average construct (n=21,600). 
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politics).5  For a point of comparison, we also test the relative contribution to 
cognitive awareness of identification with a political party and membership in 
civic associations. Previous research shows that these factors are often important 
determinants of a mobilized, rather than autonomous form of participation and 
citizenship in Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). 
 
We begin by examining the bivariate linkages of each of these factors.  We find 
that formal education in Africa is strongly correlated with news media use and 
political information, but has a more modest linkage with cognitive engagement, 
and virtually nothing in common with political efficacy (Table 2). Formal 
education also makes a far greater difference for news media use, and the 
acquisition of political information than does identification with a political party 
or membership in a civic group.  However, it appears that group membership 
and partisan loyalty promote cognitive engagement with politics at least as well 
as formal education.  
 
Table 2: Formal Education and Cognitive Awareness (Bivariate 
Correlations) 
 Formal 
Education 
Party 
Identification
Group 
Membership
Media 
Use 
Political 
Information 
Cognitive 
Engagement 
Partisan 
Identification 
 
.040***      
Group 
Membership 
 
.074*** .100***     
News Media 
Use 
 
.494*** .038*** .116***    
Political 
Information 
 
.355*** .186*** .174*** .308***   
Cognitive 
Engagement 
 
.171*** .271*** .166*** .218*** .273***  
Political 
Efficacy 
.046*** .052*** .034*** .069*** .088*** .104*** 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficients 
N=21,482 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
 
                                                 
5 The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson’s r = .48) and strongly reliable 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .65) warranting the creation of a two item average construct (n=21,600). 
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However, each of these coefficients is probably inflated because they mask the 
fact that each variable shares similar patterns on demographic variables (age, 
rural/urban location, gender and poverty), as well as overlapping variance with 
the other elements of cognitive awareness.  Thus, in order to obtain the cleanest 
assessment of the independent linkage of formal education with each element of 
cognitive awareness, we calculate partial correlation coefficients, holding 
constant their demographic correlates and other elements of cognitive 
awareness.   
 
Table 3 confirms that citizens with higher levels of formal education are indeed 
far more likely to use news media and to be aware of the identity of leaders, as 
well as other basic political facts and constitutional rules.  However, formal 
education seems to offer no real advantage in terms of increasing citizens’ 
cognitive engagement or political efficacy.  Cognitive engagement seems to be 
promoted far more effectively by identification with a political party and, to a 
lesser extent, membership in civic organizations. Thus, the main impact of 
formal education in Africa on the cognitive awareness of politics is through the 
stimulation of news media use and by giving citizens the skills to accumulate 
basic facts about the political system, rather than of increasing cognitive 
engagement or efficacy. 
 
Table 3: Formal Education and Cognitive Awareness (Multivariate 
Correlations) 
 Formal 
Education 
Party 
Identification
Group 
Membership
Media 
Use 
Political 
Information 
Cognitive 
Engagement 
News Media 
Use 
 
    .305***    .118***  .104***    
Political 
Information 
 
   .230*** -.019**  .105*** .108***   
Cognitive 
Engagement 
 
   .034***    .223***   .092*** .126*** .134***  
Efficacy/ 
Competence 
 
.002NS .017* .003NS .032*** .042*** .040*** 
Partial correlation coefficients controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender, lived poverty, 
group membership and partisan identification, as well as every other element of cognitive 
awareness. 
N=21,157 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
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Taking note of the partial correlations amongst the other variables, we can 
construct the beginnings of a proto path model where formal education’s main 
impacts are in stimulating news media use, and the accumulation of political 
information (see Figure 3).  In turn, both political information and news media 
use bring about higher levels of cognitive engagement. Political efficacy, 
apparently, develops in isolation of either enlightenment or mobilization.  Thus, 
to the extent that formal education has an indirect impact on other elements of 
democratic citizenship, we observe that it flows primarily through greater news 
media use and higher level of factual knowledge about politics.   
Formal Education
Group 
Membership
Partisan 
Identification
Political 
Information
News Media Use
Political Efficacy
Cognitive 
Engagement
Figure 3: Formal Education and Elements of Cognitive Awareness
 
Given the results of the multivariate assessment of the linkages amongst 
cognitive awareness, we turn to assess the impact of formal education on a range 
of aspects of democratic citizenship, by first estimating its direct effects but also 
by measuring its indirect effects via increased news media use and the 
accumulation of political information. Do higher individual levels of higher 
formal education, either directly or indirectly, promote higher individual rates of 
democratic participation in Africa?  Does it make Africans more articulate?  Do 
they promote greater endorsement of key democratic values?  And do they make 
people more critical of political and economic performance? 
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Our method of analysis is to conduct multivariate, ordinary least squares 
regression analysis in which formal education and the four key elements of 
cognitive awareness reviewed above (news media use, political information, 
cognitive engagement, and efficacy) are regressed, iteratively, on a series of 
dependent variables, in each case holding constant age, rural/urban location, 
gender, and lived poverty.  This procedure allows us to isolate the direct impact 
of formal education (as expressed by the unstandardized regression coefficient, 
or b).  Then, in each case, we run a second analysis to estimate the total potential 
explanatory power (in terms of the block adjusted R2) of only formal education, 
news media use, and political information, which as we have just seen would 
enable us to capture the most likely direct and indirect democratic impacts of 
schooling. 
 
 
Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and 
Political Participation 
 
We begin by asking whether educated Africans are likely to become involved in 
democratic politics. We examine the direct or indirect (via increased political 
information and use of the news media) effects of education on conventional 
forms of participation, ranging from relatively simple acts such as identifying 
with a political party, registering to vote, and voting, to increasingly difficult 
forms such as joining civic associations (religious, community and business 
groups as well as trade unions), taking part in community affairs (attending 
community meetings and working with other people on local issues), and 
contacting formal leaders (such as MPs, local councilors and government 
officials) and informal leaders (such as religious and traditional leaders).  We 
also test for linkages with unconventional forms of participation, specifically 
taking part in protests. 
 
Looking at the far right column of Table 4, we see that the combined effects of 
formal education, political information and news media use tell us very little 
about who does and does not participate in African politics.  Only with regard to 
contacting formal leaders do these cognitive factors form a substantial part of 
the explanation (jointly explaining 5 percent of the variation in this activity).  
The direct effects of schooling are even more negligible.  Holding constant a 
range of associated factors, education has statistically significant correlations 
only with contacting officials and joining civic association; and the size of the 
effect is miniscule.  
13 
 
Table 4: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Political 
Participation 
 Formal 
Education 
(0-9) 
b 
News 
Media Use
(0-4) 
b 
Political 
Information
(0-6) 
b 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
Block R2 N 
Formal Contact .007*  .016**   .047*** .117 .051 19,976 
       
Partisan 
Identification 
 
-.003NS -.008**   .039*** .095 .035 21,182 
Group Membership .010* .115***   .075*** .068 .035 21,168 
       
Community 
Participation 
 
-.007NS -.014*   .063*** .136 .032 21,175 
Informal Contact .024*** -.011NS   .040*** .073 .022 18,766 
       
Registered  & 
Voted 
-.002NS  .003NS   .019*** .115 .020 21,182 
       
Protest 
 
-.000NS .075*** -.007NS .046 .017 21,178 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy.  
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
 
Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and 
Articulateness 
 
If formal education makes little difference to political participation in Africa, 
does it at least increase ordinary Africans’ abilities to articulate preferences and 
opinions about political life?  We assess people’s ability to offer opinions about 
the state and political regime in which they live in several ways.  First we use a 
single item that measures respondents’ ability to provide a response 
spontaneously to an open-ended question that asked: “What, if anything, does 
‘democracy’ mean to you?” We also use three valid and reliable indices that 
assess respondents’ abilities to offer preferences and opinions (regardless of 
whether they are positive or negative).  The first index simply sums the number 
of substantive opinions respondents were able to offer across 20 questions on the 
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performance of democracy (the freeness and fairness of elections, satisfaction 
with democracy, and the extent of democracy) and government (the extent of 
official corruption, the responsiveness of elected representatives, the degree to 
which the electoral system produces accountability, and the overall job 
performance of key incumbent leaders).  The second index measures people’s 
ability to offer preferences about democracy and non-democratic alternatives 
across 4 survey items. And the third measures people’s ability to give their 
preferences to 27 question items that ask about political, social and economic 
values. 
 
Table 5 shows a substantial direct and indirect impact. Higher levels of 
education, news media use, and political information each make significant and 
positive contributions to increasing Africans’ ability to offer opinions (positive 
or negative) about the performance of the political system (11 percent variance 
explained), provide preferences about democracy versus alternative regimes (10 
percent), and a range of social and political values (8 percent), as well as provide 
some meaning to the word “democracy” (9 percent).   
 
 
Table 5: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Articulateness 
 Formal 
Education 
(0-9) 
b 
News 
Media 
Use 
(0-4) 
B 
Political 
Information 
(0-6) 
b 
 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
 
 
Block 
R2 
 
 
 
N 
Able to Offer Opinion 
on Performance 
.313*** .315*** .437*** .131 .108 21,105 
Able to Offer Opinion 
on Democracy  
.032*** .048*** .057*** .117 .097 21,161 
Able to Offer Meaning 
of Democracy 
.013*** .052*** .030*** .110 .091 21,182 
Able to Offer 
Responses to Value 
Questions 
.053*** .040*** .227*** .101 .079 19,903 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
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Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and 
Democratic Values 
 
While educated Africans are more likely to offer preferences and opinions, we 
now turn to examine the content of those expressed attitudes. We begin by 
examining people’s values, as measured by a wide range of different questions 
in the Afrobarometer that ask people about democracy and its alternatives, as 
well as tap their support for a range of other democratic practices and norms.   
 
First, we attempt to replicate earlier findings (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 
2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; and Evans & Rose, 2007a, 2007b), and to test the 
direct and indirect impacts of formal education on public demand for democracy 
(measured as support  for democracy and rejection of presidential dictatorship, 
military rule and one party rule).  We also assess whether education encourages 
Africans to embrace a series of key democratic values.   
 
We tap popular demand for the rule of law, we construct an index from three 
questions that assess whether respondents feel (1) “It is important to obey the 
government in power no matter who you voted for,” (2) “It is better to find legal 
solutions to problems even if it takes longer,” and (3) “The use of violence is 
never justified in [e.g. your country’s] politics today”. We also assess opposition 
to corruption by asking respondents whether different corruption scenarios are 
“wrong and punishable.” We measure demand for freedom of expression 
through three questions that ask people whether (1) “the news media should be 
free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down,” (2) 
“People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government 
influence,” and (3) “We should be able to join any organization, whether or not 
the government approves of it.”  To assess demand for political equality, we use 
a single question item that asks people whether “All people should be able to 
vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.”  And to 
measure support for demand for gender equality, we use answers to two 
questions: (1) “women should have the same chance of being elected to political 
office as men,” and (2) “women should have equal rights and receive the same 
treatment as men.”6 
 
To assess demand for bureaucratic accountability, we use a battery of items that 
ask people what they would do if they encountered a range of different instances 
                                                 
6 Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.54) which explains 51.2 
percent of the common variance.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .51) is low and barely 
acceptable (n=20,389). 
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of bureaucratic intransigence (with active citizenship indicated by those who say 
they would take some form of positive action or protest). We tap demand for 
electoral accountability with two items that ask people about who is responsible 
for “making sure that, once elected” members of parliament and local 
government “do their jobs” (with the democratic response indicated by those 
who say that it is the job of the voters, rather than the President, Legislature or 
political party).7 Finally, to tap the extent to which Africans see themselves as 
active agents or passive subjects of authority, we use a series of single items that 
ask: (1) whether elected leaders should “listen to what the people say” rather 
than “follow their own ideas”; (2) whether people, rather than government, “are 
responsible for their own well-being”; (3) and whether people “should be more 
active in questioning the actions of our leaders.”   
 
Table 6 confirms earlier findings that education has a positive and sizable 
impact on the demand for democracy by itself and indirectly through news 
media use and political information, each of which also has a positive impact (a 
“block” adjusted R2 of 9 percent). We also find that education has a notable 
impact on people’s stated willingness to confront bureaucratic intransigence and 
demand accountability (4 percent).  Across the rest of these values, however, the 
total impact of education, news media use and political information is negligible 
to non-existent.  While formal education generally increases the extent to which 
citizens support a range of democratic principles such as equality, expression 
and accountability,8 the overall size of the impact is almost always very small.  
In general, cognitive factors seem to have very little to do with whether or not 
Africans hold democratic values or predispositions.9  
 
 
                                                 
7 The two items are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r = .74) and strongly reliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .84) warranting the creation of a two item average construct (n=21,600). 
8 However, consistent with earlier research (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) we find 
that educated Africans are less likely to favor a universal franchise. 
9 The results shown on Table 6 were calculated on dependent variables where “don’t know” 
responses were recoded to middle categories on the response scale.  Because more educated 
respondents were less likely to say they “don’t know” across these items, we also recalculated 
each of these equations using dependent variables that excluded the “don’t know” responses.  
The results were virtually identical across all items. 
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Table 6: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Democratic 
Values 
 Formal 
Education
(0-9) 
b 
News 
Media 
Use 
(0-4) 
b 
Political 
Information
(0-6) 
b 
 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
 
Block 
R2 
 
 
 
N 
Demand Democracy   .058***  065***   .064*** .104 .089 21,182
Demand Bureaucratic 
Accountability 
  .023***  .001NS   .017*** .050 .040 21,182
People Responsible for 
Well-Being 
 .008NS .106***   .054*** .038 .025 19,981
Demand Gender Equality   .054***  074***    .036*** .047 .023 19,982
Demand Free  Expression   .080*** .018*  -.036*** .028 .022 21,174
People Should Question 
Leaders 
 .021**   .019NS    .085*** .023 .017 19,985
Leaders Should Listen To 
People 
.010NS -.063***    .086*** .018 .016 19,968
All People Should Have 
Equal Vote 
 -.063*** -.059*** .012* .016 .015 19,983
Demand Representative 
Accountability 
   .018***  -.049**     .049*** .020 .014 21,182
Interpersonal Trust  -.021*** -.013*   -.028*** .016 .013 19,564
Demand Rule of Law  -.025*** -.046***    .049*** .028 .012 21,174
Opposes Corruption   .012***  .020*** .002NS .024 .010 21,180
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
 
Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and 
Critical Citizenship 
 
If they are not especially likely to hold more pro-democratic dispositions, are 
educated Africans more likely to offer critical evaluations of political and 
economic performance?  We examine the impact of formal education, news 
media use and political information on a wide range of evaluations of political 
performance. At the broadest level of the political regime, we begin with 
Africans’ evaluations of the supply of democracy provided by their multiparty 
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regime (calculated as someone who both thinks they are living in a democracy 
and is satisfied with the way democracy works).  At an intermediate level, we 
look at the perceived legitimacy of the political system (an index of responses to 
questions about whether the constitution reflects the values of all citizens, and 
the right of the police, courts, and tax authority to make people comply with 
their decisions).  People’s evaluations of the status of political freedoms are 
measured by a series of questions that ask whether people’s ability to say what 
they want, join any organization they want, vote without fear, influence 
government and not worry about either arbitrary arrest or crime has improved 
over the past five years. We measure trust in state institutions (police, army and 
courts), government institutions (President, Parliament, local councilor, 
Electoral Commission, and governing party), state media (electronic and print) 
and independent media (electronic and print).   
 
At the most specific level, we measure evaluations of presidential performance 
and the performance of other representatives (MPs and local councilors), the 
extent of corruption amongst state officials (police, judges, tax officials, health 
workers and teachers) and government leaders (President, MPs, local 
councilors), as well as the perceived responsiveness of elected officials (again, 
MPs and local councilors). We measure even more specific evaluations of 
government policy performance in with regard to macro-economic management 
(economic management, creating jobs, keeping prices low, narrowing the 
income gap, and delivering food), delivering services (health care, education, 
water, and HIV/AIDS programs), fighting crime and corruption, and local 
government performance in delivering a range of goods (maintaining roads, 
keeping the community clean, collecting taxes, and spending revenues).  Finally, 
we use Afrobarometer items that ask people about the status of economic goods 
(whether there are more goods, more jobs, and a smaller income gap than five 
years ago), their economic expectations and their evaluations of current national 
and personal economic conditions.   
 
Since we have just demonstrated that educated Africans are consistently less 
likely to say they “don’t know,” we conducted theses analyses using versions of 
the dependent variables that exclude “don’t know” responses.10  Three main 
 
                                                 
10 We replicated this analysis for each item with a version of the variable that recodes “don’t 
know” responses to a middle category.  In contrast to values, we found that the combined 
impact of education, news media use and political information was consistently larger when 
we use the versions that exclude “don’t know” responses. 
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Table 7: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Performance Evaluations 
 Formal 
Education 
(0-9) 
b 
News 
Media Use
(0-4) 
b 
Political 
Information 
(0-6) 
b 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
Block 
R2 
N 
Personal Economic 
Conditions 
 
  .011***   .115*** .020*** .199 .091 20,123 
Status of Political 
Freedom 
 
 -089*** .008NS   .098*** .091 .059 19,073 
Trust Government 
Institutions 
 
 -.146***  -.065***    .070*** .106 .055 17,407 
Trust State Media 
 
 -.168***  -.046***    .069*** .084 .054 13,079 
Economic 
Expectations 
 
 -.075***   .110***   .078*** .103 .046 17,759 
Status of Economic 
Goods 
 
 -.039***   .084***    .054*** .112 .038 19,707 
Trust State Institutions 
 
 -.122***  -.053***    .028*** .056 .036 19,380 
Govt Economic 
Performance 
 
 -.056***   .074***     .058*** .103 .034 18,224 
Supply of Democracy 
 
 -.082***   .031***   .048*** .079 .030 17,020 
National Economic 
Conditions 
 
 -.021***    .067***    .041*** .090 .030 20,426 
Government Service 
Delivery 
 
 -.044***   .028***    .057*** .091 .029 18,982 
Presidential 
Performance 
 
 -.102***  -.045***    .106*** .066 .026 19,909 
Elections Free and 
Fair 
 
 -.122***  -.039***    .048*** .058 .022 19,149 
Representative 
Performance 
 
 -.098***  -.034***    .032*** .055 .018 17,753 
Local Government 
Delivery 
 
 -.068***    .048***    .023*** .061 .014 17,572 
Government 
Corruption 
 
 .043***    .079*** -.005NS .039 .011 14,191 
Legitimacy 
 
 -.020***  .010NS    .042*** .025 .010 16,143 
Responsiveness 
 
 -.049***  .016NS     .041*** .027 .009 18,495 
Trust Independent 
Media 
 
 -.082***  .032**   .021** .018 .009 14,670 
State Corruption -.003NS    .056***   .022*** .022 .004 14,690 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
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findings emerge (see Table 7).  First, formal education, media use and political 
information have sizeable impacts on how people evaluate the national 
economy, the status of political rights, and the degree of trust they place in 
government and state. Second, with one exception, formal education 
consistently has a statistically significant and negative impact on performance 
evaluations.  Thus, schooling not only enables Africans to offer more opinions, 
it also allows them to offer more critical opinions.  Third, the contributions that 
formal schooling makes toward enabling more critical citizenship are mitigated 
by the effects of higher levels of political information and, sometimes, the 
effects of news media use.  That is, while education (holding constant media use 
and information) makes people more critical of performance, we know that 
formal education simultaneously leads people to acquire greater amounts of 
political information, which in turn (holding constant education and news media 
use) make people consistently more forgiving of bad performance (see the 
unstandardized coefficients for political information in Table 7).  Moreover, 
while higher levels of news media consumption sometime induce greater 
criticalness, they more often have the opposite effect of making people more 
forgiving.   
 
 
Higher Education and Democratic Citizenship 
 
Against this broad context of formal education’s overall effects, which was 
based on a comparison of respondents up and down the educational scale, we 
now narrow our focus to examine the particular impact of higher education.  As 
seen in Table 1, the overall political impact of college and university education 
in Africa on citizen behavior is likely to be minimal simply because so few 
citizens ever progress to these levels.  However, there are many good reasons to 
suspect that the micro-level democratic payoff might be more substantial.  If 
Africa’s schools are the sites of rote learning, its colleges and universities offer 
at least the possibility of a different pedagogy.  As stated earlier, higher 
education may be effective in promoting critical skills and habits, and 
encouraging students to appreciate diversity, difference, ambiguity, 
contradiction and nuance (see Cross et al, 1999 and World Bank, 2000).  As 
noted earlier, university students were a driving force behind the popular 
protests that brought down many of Africa’s dictators in the early 1990s 
(Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997), and younger, university-trained elected 
representatives have formed the core of cross-party coalitions that have initiated 
recent reforms in some African parliaments (Barkan et al, 2004). 
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In order to assess the degree to which Africans who have been to college or 
university think or act differently, and to isolate that impact from the fact that 
Africans who have been to college or university also have a high school 
diploma, we restrict all subsequent analysis to only those who have completed a 
high school education, comparing those with any university exposure to those 
who have either completed high school or have some technical training (see 
Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4: University attendance, by country, 2005-2006 
 
 
 
 
We begin by repeating the same initial analyses we conducted on formal 
education and examine the bivariate associations of post-secondary education 
among this smaller group of school leavers (Table 8).  We see one interesting 
contrast: while African citizens with higher levels of formal schooling tend to be 
younger than their less educated respondents, those who have been to university 
tend to be slightly older than those with a high school education only.  
Otherwise, university attendees are similar to the overall profile of educated 
people: they are more urban, and more male, and they also are less likely to 
experience poverty than high school graduates.  But the differences between 
these two groups are far less pronounced than across the full educational 
spectrum.   
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Table 8: Demographic Correlates of Formal Education 
 Formal Education High School Completed 
Vs. 
At Least Some University
Age -.281***  .059*** 
  
Rural -.279*** -.141*** 
  
Lived Poverty -.255*** -.146*** 
  
Female -.107*** -.060*** 
  
N= (21,269) (4721) 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficients 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
 
Similarly, the effects of higher education (when compared to those of high 
school education) on news media use and political information are also far more 
modest than those of formal education in general (Table 9).  And once we apply 
the relevant multivariate controls, we see that those who go on to university 
education are only slightly more likely to use the news media or know basic 
facts about the political system than ordinary school-leavers (Table 10). 
 
 
Table 9: Post Secondary Education and Cognitive Awareness (Bivariate 
Correlations) 
 Some 
University 
Party 
Identification
Group 
Membership
News 
Media Use
Political 
Information 
Cognitive 
Engagement 
News Media 
Use 
 
.176*** -.008NS .057***    
Political 
Information 
 
.108*** .125*** .189*** .145***   
Cognitive 
Engagement 
.107*** .213*** .175*** .175*** .210***  
Efficacy/ 
Competence 
 
.048*** .064*** .053*** .080*** .106*** .151*** 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficients 
N=471 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
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Table 10: Post-Secondary Education and Cognitive Awareness 
(Multivariate Correlations) 
 Some 
University 
Party 
Identification
Group 
Membership
News 
Media Use
Political 
Information 
Cognitive 
Engagement 
News Media 
Use 
 
  .081***  .013NS   .072***    
Political 
Information 
 
  .060***    .086***   .142***   .058***   
Cognitive 
Engagement 
 
  .077***    .182***   .106***   .140***  .113***  
Efficacy/ 
Competence 
 
.018NS .028NS .007NS .035* .039** .110*** 
Partial correlations controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well 
as every other element of cognitive awareness. 
N=4686 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
Given these result, we again conduct multivariate, ordinary least squares 
regression analyses in which formal education is regressed, iteratively, on a 
series of dependent variables holding constant the four key elements of 
cognitive awareness (news media use, political information, cognitive 
engagement, and efficacy) as well as age, rural/urban location, gender and 
poverty. This enables us to isolate the independent statistical impact of higher 
education.  But since we have demonstrated that there appears to be little chance 
of an appreciable “knock-on” effect of higher education via greater use of news 
media or the acquisition of more political information, we estimate a “block” R2 
by simply regressing each dependent variable on higher education only.  
 
Does university education appreciably increase democratic political 
participation in Africa? Table 11 shows that Africans with at least some 
university education are less likely than high school graduates to identify with a 
political party, and more likely to become involved in protest and contact formal 
officials, the absolute size of the difference is relatively small.11  As with formal 
education in general, higher education plays no role in encouraging people to 
join civil society organizations, become involved in community affairs, or vote.   
 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, higher education has no statistically significant impacts when entered into a 
regression analysis on its  own.  Significant impacts emerge only after holding constant other 
elements of cognitive awareness and demographic factors.   
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Table 11: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Political 
Participation 
 At Least 
Some 
University 
(0-1) 
b 
 
 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
 
 
Block R2 
 
 
 
N 
Partisan Identification 
 
    -.126*** .077 .006 4,699 
Protest 
 
      .149*** .041 .006 4,699 
Formal Contact 
 
  .049* .114 .004 4,231 
Group Membership 
 
   .057NS .091 .001 4,697 
Community Participation 
 
   .034NS .151 .000 4,699 
Informal Contact 
 
    .007NS .082 .000 4,076 
Registered & Voted  
 
    .000NS .118 .001 4,699 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as 
cognitive engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
Compared to high school leavers, university attendees are very slightly more 
able to offer opinions on government performance, but exhibit no statistically 
significant differences in terms of their ability to provide a meaning of 
democracy, or offer preferences about democracy and a range of other social 
and political values.   
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Table 12: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Articulateness 
 Some 
University 
(0-1) 
b 
 
 
Total 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
 
 
Block R2 
 
 
 
N 
Able to Offer Opinions on 
Government Performance 
-.284* .037 .000 4686 
Able to Offer Meaning of 
Democracy 
 
 -.016NS .034 .000 4699 
Able to Offer Preferences on 
Democracy 
 
  .002NS .033 .001 4695 
Able to Offer Value Preferences  
 
 -.066NS .045 .000 4222 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
 
And compared to school leavers, those who have attended university are very 
slightly more likely to demand freedom of expression.  In fact, they are less 
likely to believe that everyone should have an equal vote, or to say that elected 
leaders should be governed by public opinion (rather than their own beliefs).  
Yet the most important finding here is that there is virtually no difference 
between high school graduates and those who have attended African universities 
in terms of their social and political values.   
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Table 13: University Education and Democratic Values 
 At Least Some 
University 
(0-1) 
b 
 
 
Total Adjusted 
R2 
 
 
 
Block R2“ 
 
 
 
N 
All People Should Have Equal Vote 
 
  -.148** .004 .002 4233
Leaders Should Listen To People 
 
-.100* .010 .000 4230
Demand Bureaucratic Accountability 
 
-.027* .010 .000 4699
Demand Freedom of Expression 
 
 .104* .025 .000 4698
Demand for Democracy (0-4) 
 
   .044NS .033 .002 4699
Demand Gender Equality 
 
   .037NS .056 .001 4232
People Responsible for Well-Being 
 
   .010NS .025 .001 4232
Demand Rule of Law 
 
  -.039NS .040 .000 4698
Demand Representative 
Accountability 
 
  -.008NS .019 .000 4699
Opposition to Corruption 
 
   .015NS .016 .000 4698
People Should Question Leaders 
 
   .024NS .006 .000 4232
Interpersonal Trust 
 
   .054NS .002 .000 4232
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
 
The most consistent impacts of university education can be seen in terms of 
performance evaluations.  Controlling the other elements of cognitive awareness 
and demographic factors, we find that (with one exception), university attendees 
are consistently more likely to offer more critical evaluations of the performance 
of their economies, governments and political regimes.  At the same time, the 
size of the impact is quite limited.  At most, those who have been to university 
are only about one-fifth to one-fourth of a point more negative than high school 
graduates on four or five point scales. 
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Table 14: University Education and Critical Performance Evaluations 
 At Least 
Some 
University  
(0-1) 
b 
 
 
Total 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 
Block R2“ 
 
 
 
N 
Personal Economic Conditions 
 
  .077* .211 .012 4690 
Trust State Media 
 
    -.374*** .085 .005 3687 
Trust Government Institutions 
 
    -.279*** .089 .002 4693 
Economic Expectations 
 
-.094* .185 .002 4695 
Government Corruption 
 
     .197*** .045 .002 4697 
Presidential Performance 
 
    -.350*** .082 .002 4699 
Supply of Democracy 
 
    -.291*** .094 .001 4698 
Government Control of Crime & 
Corruption 
 
    -.216*** .076 .001 4698 
Elections Free & Fair 
 
 -.235** .055 .000 4695 
Status of Political Freedom  
 
   -.197*** .157 .000 4697 
Trust State Institutions 
 
   -.168*** .043 .000 4695 
Status of Economic Goods 
 
   -.111*** .167 .000 4696 
Government Service Delivery 
 
   -.132*** .113 .000 4694 
National Economic Conditions 
 
    -.146*** .128 .000 4697 
Government Economic 
Performance 
 
    -.143*** .129 .000 4696 
Representative Performance 
 
-.120* .060 .000 4697 
Legitimacy 
 
-.087* .041 .000 4696 
Local Government Delivery 
 
-.092* .060 .000 4699 
Responsiveness 
 
-.102* .012 .000 4698 
State Corruption 
 
  .086* .025 .000 4695 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive 
engagement and efficacy. 
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001 
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Conclusions 
 
Africa is a continent of “low information societies” characterized by poor 
communications infrastructure, limited access to news media, low levels of 
schooling and even lower levels of access to higher education (Mattes & 
Shenga, 2007). Against this backdrop, one might expect that the limited 
availability of education would provide significant advantages for the minority 
of citizens who are able to attend school or university.  The evidence reviewed 
in this paper does indeed suggest that Africa’s schools and universities have paid 
some democratic dividends.  
 
Viewed across 18 countries, increasing levels of formal education both enable 
and stimulate Africans to make greater use of the media to get news about 
politics. It also facilitates citizens’ acquisition of the basic information that 
allows them to make sense of the larger political system.  Both news media use 
and political information, in turn, lead citizens to become much more 
cognitively engaged with politics, both taking a greater interest in and actively 
discussing politics with friends and neighbors (though education plays no direct 
role in this respect).  
 
Africans with higher levels of schooling are also more likely to display key 
critical skills.  Not only are educated respondents more likely to formulate 
preferences and offer evaluations of political and economic performance, they 
are also more likely to offer critical opinions, especially in terms of how they 
rate the national economy and the degree to which they distrust government and 
state institutions, including state-run news media.  Higher levels of schooling 
also lead Africans to demand democracy, that is, to see democracy as the most 
preferable regime and to reject non-democratic forms of government such as the 
one party state, strong man dictators or military rule.   
 
Beyond the preference of democracy to other regimes, however, formal 
education does not produce other democratic orientations. There are few 
significant, and even fewer substantive differences between less and more 
educated respondents in terms of a wide range of values such as individualism, 
equality, expression, trust in others, accountability, or probity in government.  
Finally, education makes an extremely limited contribution to political 
participation.  Educated respondents are more likely to contact formal officials 
(a more individualistic form of participation), they are no more or less likely to 
vote, identify with a political party, join civic groups, get involved in 
community affairs or protest.  
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Higher education, however, has far more limited effects on enhancing 
democratic citizenship.  Those Africans with a university education are, indeed, 
more critical of the performance of the economy, their government and the 
larger political regime, though the size of the differences are small.  In general, 
those Africans who have attended university display few statistically significant, 
and even fewer substantively important differences with high school graduates 
in terms of political information, news media consumption, political 
participation, articulateness or pro-democratic values.   
 
Even with the enormous challenges faced by Africa’s schools, students who 
move up the educational ladder and complete high school become more 
knowledgeable, more articulate and more critical democrats (at least in 
comparison to the majority of citizens interviewed in the 18 countries included 
in the Afrobarometer surveys of 2005-2006 who had a primary school education 
or less). Why, however, do we fail to see any further democratic progress 
amongst those who have managed to get a university education? Is it the content 
of the curricula that fails to provide any greater knowledge or stimulate interest 
and engagement?  Or is it the style of teaching that fails to kindle debate and 
greater critical thinking? Has the brain drain simply robbed the continent’s 
universities of too many of its intellectuals and qualified lecturers?  Or does a 
lack of resources and massive overcrowding simply overwhelm both students 
and faculty and nullify the impact of an adequate curricula and pedagogy? To 
answer such questions, we will need to broaden the analytic focus to make more 
direct comparisons of Africa with other continents, especially other developing 
regions such as Asia and Latin America. But we will also need to narrow it to 
examine not only cross-national and cross-regional differences within Africa, 
but focus it to allow us to compare across universities and curricula.  Answering 
these questions through a sustained research program will not only improve the 
quality of higher education, but also assist in the development of democracy on 
the continent.   
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